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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0431

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FM US REP MBFR

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: JULY 21, 1977 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 21, 1977 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE FINAL PLENARY MEETING OF THE TWELTH ROUND OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON JULY 21, SOVIET REP (TARASOV) AND US REP MADE THE ONLY STATEMENTS. US REP'S STATEMENT IS BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY. THE SOVIET PRESENTATION INCLUDED A STRONGLY WORDED ATTACK ON THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH. IN AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO THE JULY 15 WESTERN DATA DISAGGREGATION PROPOSAL, TARASOV ACCUSED THE WEST OF SEEKING TO BOG THE DATA DISCUSSION DOWN IN AN IMPENETRABLE MASS OF DETAIL. HE LINKED THE WESTERN REFUSAL TO TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS TO A POSSIBLE DESIRE TO
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SHIELD THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA FROM REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. SOVIET REP ALSO TIED WESTERN RELUCTANCE TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DATA DISCREPANCY TO THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROVING THAT THE WESTERN THEORY OF FORCE DISPARITIES FAVORING THE EAST WAS FOUNDED IN FACT. TARASOV FURTHER CHARGED THAT THE WEST APPEARED TO BE

PUTTING THE BRAKES ON THE VIENNA TALKS AND WARNED THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH ANY ATTEMPTS TO DISCARD THE BULK OF THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER AND TO CONCENTRATE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON, FOR EXAMPLE, STABILIZING AND OTHER CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. SOVIET REP SAID THAT EAST HAD LONG AGO REJECTED THE DECEMBER 1975 WESTERN PROPOSALS, CALLED UPON THE WEST TO NEGOTIATE UPON THE BASIS OF THE EAST'S COMPROMISE PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 1976, AND PRESSED FOR ACCEPTANCE IN THE INTERIM OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL AS A PREFERABLE ALTERNATIVE TO A RENEWAL OF THE ARMS RACE IN THE AREA THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION BY NATO OF SUCH NEW WEAPONS AS THE CRUISE MISSILE AND NEUTRON WARHEAD. THE FULL TEXT OF THE INFORMAL DELEGATION TRANSLATION OF TARASOV'S STATEMENT, WHICH WAS DELIVERED IN RUSSIAN, FOLLOWS:

MR CHAIRMAN

1. THE TWELTH ROUND WHICH IS COMING TO A CLOSE TODAY HAS NOT BROUGHT, UNFORTUNATELY, ANY SUBSTANTIAL STEPTS FORWARD IN ACHIEVING THE AIMS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THE NEED ARISES TO CONSIDER WHY THIS ROUND TOO SHOULD HAVE BECOME ONE OF LOST POSSIBILITIES.

2. IF WE ASSUME A REAL DESIRE ON THE PART OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO REACH AN EFFECTIVE REDUCTION IN THE MILITARY POTENTIALS
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IN CENTRAL EUROPE THEN NO INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLES STAND BEFORE US. THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN LIVING IN CONDITIONS OF PEACE FOR A THIRD OF A CENTURY. THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION, DESPITE ALL ITS UNEVENNESSES, IS CHARACTERIZED IN THIS AREA BY THE RELAXATION OF TENSION BROUGH ABOUT BY FORCE OF MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS COOPERATION. THIS SITUATION IS EXPLAINED, ALONG WITH OTHER REASONS, BY THE FACT THAT IN THE CENTRE OF THIS CONTINENT, WHERE THERE IS A LINE OF CONTIGUITY BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, AN APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ARMED FORCES OF BOTH SIDES HAS COME ABOUT. IF THERE IS INDEED SOME OR OTHER DANGER FOR THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES, THEN THE REASON FOR IT IS TO BE FOUND NOT IN THE MILITARY WEAKNESS OF ONE OF THE SIDES NOR IN THE UNEQUAL STRENGTH OF THE OTHER BUT IN THE FACT THAT IN THIS AREA THERE HAS ACCUMULATED ALTOGETHER TOO MUCH HIGHLY EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL.

3. THE VERY OPENING OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS BECAME POSSIBLE PRECISELY BECAUSE AN APPROXIMATE EQUALITY HAD EMERGED AND EXISTS IN THE SIZES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS HAS BEEN A BASIC POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FROM THE VERY BEGINNING AND THIS FACT HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY RECOGNISED BY THE

LEADERS OF WESTERN

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STATES AS WELL. JUST A FEW DAYS AGO, ON 12 JULY, THE PRESIDENT
OF THE USA, MR. CARTER, REPLYING TO A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE
NATO COUNTRIES IN EUROPE WERE NOT IN A WORSE SITUATION COMPARED
TO THE WARSAW PACT IN THE AREA OF CONVENTIAL GROUND FORCES
AND ABOUT THE PROSPECTS IN THIS CONNECTION OF THE UNITED STATES
USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT, STATED THAT
EVEN WITHOUT USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS NATO HAS SUFFICIENT FORCES TO
ARREST AN INVASION BY THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT. (INTER-
NATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE 13 JULY 1977). WHERE IS THE REFERENCE
TO "SIGNIFICANT DISPARITIES" ABOUT WHICH OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES
TELL US AND WHY DOES THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES UN-
DERMINE, ACCORDING TO THEM, STABILITY IN EUROPE? IT IS NOTEWORTHY
THAT IN THE STATEMENT QUOTED ABOVE THE REFERENCE IS TO PRECISELY
THOSE CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES IN WHICH THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES
PARTICULARLY LIKE TO SEEK DISPARITIES. THE SORE OF
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DISPARITIES WHICH WOULD CREATE A REAL THREAT TO THE WEST OR UNDERMINE STABILITY DO NOT, AS YOU WILL SEE, EXIST. THEY NEITHER EXIST IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES AS A WHOLE NOR AS REGARDS CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES. THE EXCHANGE LAST YEAR OF OFFICIAL NUMERICAL DATA MERELY SERVED TO UNDERLINE THIS. THIS SITUATION OBJECTIVELY FAVOURS A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TASKS WHICH HAVE BEEN PLACED BEFORE US.

THE EQUAL PERCENTAGE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS WHICH HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973 AND IN SUBSEQUENT PROPOSALS, IN PARTICULAR THAT OF 19 FEBRUARY 1976, ARE REALLY FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THAT SORT OF PROCESS OF CONCRETE REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY MOMENT ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR THE SIDES. IN THIS WAY, THE PRESENTLY EXISTING APPROXIMATE EQUALITY WOULD NOT BE VIOLATED AND, IN THE OUTCOME, APPROXIMATE PARITY WHICH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TALK ABOUT SO MUCH, WOULD BE GUARANTEED BUT AT A SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS..

4. THE ROUND WHICH HAS JUST PASSED HOWEVER, HAS CONVINCED US EVEN MORE THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE GUIDED IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION BY COMPLETELY OTHER INTERESTS. AS THE CORNER STONE OF THEIR APPROACH THEY PLACE NOT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES AGREED DURING THE PRE-PARATORY CONSULTATIONS BUT A DESIRE TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND TO ALTER THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO. IT IS PRECISELY HERE THAT THE MAIN REASON FOR THE DRAGGING OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO BE FOUND.

5. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE CONTINUED TO BLOCK THE ELABO-
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RATION OF AGREEMENTS ON ALL QUESTIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REALLY SERIOUS AND EFFECTIVE REDUCTIONS.

6. AT THE PLENARY SESSION ON 23 JUNE OF THIS YEAR AMBASSADOR SMOLDEREN ASSERTED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACROSS-THE-BOARD REDUCTIONS OF ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES "WOULD NOT STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE". LEAVING ON ONE SIDE THE INSUBSTANTIAL NATURE OF THIS THEISIS, WHICH WE HAVE REVEALED EARLIER, IT IS USEFUL TO EXAMINE THOSE METHODS PROPOSED BY THE WESTERN STATES THEMSELVES TO STRENGTHEN PEACE.

7. THEY SEE THE PATH TOWARDS STRENGTHENING PEACE IN EUROPE

ABOVE ALL IN THE REJECTION BY ALL THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ANY ARMAMENTS REDUCTION WHATSOEVER. AS AMBASSADOR RESOR STATED IN THE PLENARY SESSION OF 15 APRIL, "THE WESTERN POSITION DOES NOT ENVISAGE REDUCTION AND LIMITATIONS IN THE ARMAMENTS OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE USA". THE IDEA OF REDUCING ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS WHICH HAS BEEN PROPOSED AND WHICH IS INSISTED UPON BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAS BEEN COUNTERED DURING THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT ROUND BY THE WESTERN STATES WITH A PROGRAMME TO SPEED UP THE INCREASE OF THEIR ARMAMENTS WHICH WAS OPENLY DECLARED AT THE MAY SESSION OF THE NATO COUNCIL.

8. FURTHERMORE THE WESTERN COUNTRIES CONSIDER THAT PEACE IN EUROPE WILL BE THE MOST STABLE OF ALL IF WE REJECT ANY REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES AND OF UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IF ON THE CONTRARY THEIR COMBAT STRENGTH IS INCREASED, IF THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH NEW SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SUCH AS CRUISE MISSILES OR THE NEUTRON BOMB.

9. FOLLOWING THE PATH TOWARDS STRENGTHENING PEACE, THE WEST WISHES TO BRING ABOUT A REDUCTION IN GROUND FORCES IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE PRESENT APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH ON THE PART OF BOTH GROUPINGS SHOULD BE REPLACED BY

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A SIGNIFICANT SUPERIORITY FOR NATO OVER THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. AS AMBASSADOR DE VOS OPENLY RECOGNISED IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE PLENARY SESSION ON 12 MAY, "IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD LEAD TO A MUCH GREATER REDUCTION IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE EAST THAN IN THOSE OF THE WEST".

10. FINALLY, ACCORDING TO THE OPINION OF THE WEST THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE IN EUROPE CAN BE GUARANTEED ONLY UNDER THE CONDITION THAT, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SO-CALLED COLLECTIVE CEILING, THE RIGHT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR INDIVIDUAL WESTERN COUNTRIES TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES EVEN IN COMPARISON WITH THEIR PRESENT LEVEL. IN THIS RESPECT, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR COX'S STATEMENT AT THE PLENARY SESSION ON 10 JUNE, "THE WEST, ...ALTHOUGH IT ALSO DEMANDS THAT THE CEILINGS SHOULD BE COLLECTIVE, CANNOT AGREE TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE SOVIET UNION COULD INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ITS ARMED FORCES IN THE REGION OF REDUCTIONS".

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

11. THEREFORE THE ESSENCE OF THE REMEDY WHICH IS PROPOSED BY THE WEST FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE CONSISTS OF: OF INCREASING ARMAMENTS INSTEAD OF REDUCING THEM; EQUIPPING AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR MISSILE FORCES WITH NEW TYPES OF WEAPONRY INSTEAD OF REDUCING THEM; CONDUCTING A CONSIDERABLY LARGER REDUCTION IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES INSTEAD OF AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION; AND GIVING THE RIGHT TO CERTAIN NATO COUNTIRES TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES EVEN BY COMPARISON WITH WHAT IT WAS BEFORE THE REDUCTION INSTEAD OF PLACING LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WHAT IS THE USE OF SUCH A "STRENGTHENING OF PEACE", IF YOU WILL ALLOW ME TO CALL IT THAT, TO EUROPE OR TO ANYBODY ELSE?
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12. IT IS COMPLETELY CLEAR THAT THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTION CANNOT STAND UP TO CRITICISM. IT IS ONE-SIDED AND CONTRADICTS COMMONSENSE. IT CUSTS ACROSS THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATION WHICH WERE SET OUT IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS SHOULD

NOW OPENLY BE TRYING TO REVISE THIS BASIC DOCUMENT.

13. IN RECENT TIME THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN MORE AND MORE OPENLY ATTEMPTING TO REPLACE THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THIS DOCUMENT BY EFFORTS TO EXERT DIRECT PRESSURE ON THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WEST DOES NOT BRING FORWARD ANY NEW COMPROMISE PROPOSALS WHATSOEVER AND DEMANDS THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SHOULD ACCEPT IN ITS ENTIRETY THE WESTERN SCHEME WHICH IS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO US. THEY IN FACT TELL US THAT WE SHOULD EITHER ACCEPT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OR THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT. FURTHERMORE THEY GIVE US TO UNDERSTAND THAT IF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DO NOT ACCEPT THE WESTERN SCHEME, ENVISAGING ESSENTIALLY A UNILATERAL REDUCTION IN THE FORCES AND THE COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, THE NATO STATES WILL UNLEASH AN EVEN MORE INTENSIVE INCREASE IN THEIR ARSENAL HAVING RAISED THEIR MILITARY BUDGETS. THE ULTIMATE CHARACTER OF THIS QUESTION - EITHER THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ACCEPT UNCONDITIONALLY THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IN VIENNA OR THE WEST WILL BEGIN A NEW ARMS RACE - WAS QUITE CLEARLY PRONOUNCED IN THE STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE USA MR BROWN (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE OF 19 MAY 1977). THE DEFENCE MINISTER OF THE FRG, MR. LEBER, OPENLY STATED THAT IF DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE EFFORT TO FORCE THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THEIR ARMED FORCES WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL, THEN THE NATO COUNTRIES WOULD ACCELERATE THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR FORCES (DIE WELT OF 20 MAY 1977).

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14. WE WISH FIRMLY TO STATE THAT THIS IS NO WAY TO DISCUSS THINGS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND NOTHING GOOD WILL COME OF IT.

15. MR CHAIRMAN

AS IN THE PAST ROUND, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE ONCE AGAIN ASSERTED THAT THE SOLUTION OF THE KEY QUESTIONS OF REDUCTION IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THE REACHING OF AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE NUMBERS. ONE COULD UNDERSTAND THIS IF THEY WERE REALLY STRIVING FOR A CLARIFICATION OF THE DISCREPANCIES WHICH HAVE ARISEN. IN FACT HOWEVER, THE WEST HAVE NOT BEEN IN A HURRY TO REACH AGREEMENT IN THIS QUESTION EITHER. THE OFFICIAL NUMERICAL DATA CONCERNING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION ARE CONTESTED BY THEM NOW AS BEFORE IN AN UNSUBSTANTIATED MANNER, AND THE ATTEMPTS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO CLARIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCIES ARE THRUST ASIDE WITHOUT AN EXPLANATION OF THE REASONS.

16. COMING ONCE AGAIN IN THE PAST ROUND TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE

QUESTION CONCERNING THE NUMERICAL DATA, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
HAVE PROCEEDED ON THE BASIS THAT IT SHOULD FACILITATE THE ACHIEVE-
MENT OF PROGRESS IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS OF
THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. HOWEVER, OUR
WESTERN PARTNERS IN PRACTICE REFUSE AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
NUMERICAL DATA WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESENTED, AND HAVE MADE USE OF THE
DISCUSSION ON NUMBERS FOR THE JUSTIFICATION OF THEIR UNFOUNDED
CONCEPTION OF DISPARITIES. IN THE COURSE OF THIS DISCUSSION,
ON WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY SPENT TWO ROUNDS, NOTHING WHICH WOULD
REFUTE THE CORRECTNESS OF OUR OFFICIAL FIGURES AND WOULD AFFIRM
THE WELL FOUNDED NATURE OF THE WESTERN ESTIMATES HAS APPEARED AND,
NATURALLY, CANNOT APPEAR"IF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS CONTINUE
TO HAVE ANY KIND OF DOUBTS ABOUT THE
AUTHENTICITY OF THE OFFICIAL NUMERICAL DATA PRESENTED BY US AND IF
THEY ARE REALLY INTERESTED IN FINDING THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY
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IN THE ESTIMATES OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES, WHY
THEN DO THEY CONTINUE TO REFUSE THE PROPOAL OF THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

TO INTRODUCE AND TO DISCUSS THE NATIONAL NUMERICAL DATA OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES FOR EACH STATE WHICH IS A DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THIS WOULD BE A MORE DIRECT AND EFFECTIVE MEANS OF REVEALING THE CAUSES OF SUCH DISCREPANCIES. APART FROM ANYTHING ELSE, HOW IS IT POSSIBLE TO COMPARE NUMERICAL MATERIALS IF UP TO THIS TIME WE HAVE NOT BEEN TOLD THE CONCRETE NUMBER WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE WESTERN ESTIMATE, ALLEGEDLY CHARACTERISES THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION?

17. THE WEST IS TAKING OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THE NUMERICAL MATERIAL OFF INTO IMPASSABLE THICKETS OF DETAIL AND AWAY FROM THE MAIN THEME WHICH IS THE CLARIFICATION OF JUST WHAT IS THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHICH CONFIDENTIAL

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ONES SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION AND WHICH ONES IN SUM CONSTITUTE THE MILITARY POTENTIALS OF BOTH GROUPINGS IN THE GIVEN REGION. BY ALL INDICATIONS, THIS IS BEING DONE WITH AN ULTERIOR MOTIVE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE AIM OF SUCH A TACTIC IS TO CONCEAL JUST WHO HAS THE CONCENTRATED BASIC STRIKING FORCES OF NATO IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TO FREE THEIR POWERFUL ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT FROM REDUCTION, AND PERMIT THEM IN THE FUTURE TO EXPAND UNDER COVER OF THE "COLLECTIVE CAP". AT FIRST GLANCE, NOTHING IN THIS TACTIC IS CHANGED EITHER BY THE PROPOSAL OF THE WEST CONCERNING THE METHODOLOGY FOR DISCUSSING NUMBERS WHICH WAS PRESENTED IN THE LAST FEW DAYS.

18. ANALYSING THE RESULTS OF THE PAST ROUND, ONE MUST SAY ALSO THAT, ACCORDING TO OUR OBSERVATIONS, IN THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN STATES THERE IS SEEN ALL THE MORE A TENDENCY TO APPLY THE BRAKES TO THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND TO TRANSFORM THE ENTIRE MATTER INTO SO-CALLED MEASURES OF STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE. IF THIS IS REALLY SO, THEN WE SHOULD LIKE HONESTLY TO WARN IN ADVANCE THAT WE SHALL NOT TAKE SUCH A PATH. IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS, WE CAN AND WILL DISCUSS ONLY SUCH MEASURES WHICH ARE REALLY CONNECTED WITH REDUCTIONS AND WHICH BY THEIR NATURE WILL CONTRIBUTE EFFECTIVELY TO THEIR REALISATION.

MR CHAIRMAN

19. THE PEOPLES ARE WAITING FOR PRACTICAL SUCCESSES IN DISARMEMENT, A REAL REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY POTENTIALS OF THE

STATES, THE COMPLEMENTING OF POLITICAL DETENTE BY CONCRETE MEASURES
IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY DETENTE. OUR PROPOSALS, AND THE WESTERN
DELEGATIONS CANNOT DENY THIS, ENVISAGE THE ADOPTION OF REALLY
SERIOUS AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES DIRECTED AT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF
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THESE GOALS.

20. WE OF COURSE UNDERSTAND THAT WE CANNOT AT THE NEGOTIATING
TABLE COMPEL THE WEST TO GO FURTHER THAN IT IS READY TO GO IN THE
SENSE OF REACHING A DEFINITE SCOPE OF REDUCTION. BUT THE OTHER
SIDE ALSO SHOULD NOT NOURISH THE ILLUSION THAT IT WILL COMPEL THE
SOCIALIST STATES TO ADOPT SUCH PROPOSALS AS WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL
TO THEIR SECURITY AND WHICH ARE AIMED AT OBTAINING UNILATERAL
MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR NATO.

21. ACCORDING TO OUR FIRM CONVICTION, THE PROPOSALS OF THE
SOCIALIST STATES OF 19 FEBRUARY 1976, WHICH IN A NUMBER OF IMPORT-
ANT RESPECTS WENT A CONSIDERABLE WAY TOWARD THE WESTERN POSITIONS,
OFFER THE REAL KEY TO REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
BASIS. IF THE WEST DOES NOT AGREE WITH THEM, THEN WE ARE READY
TO STUDY CAREFULLY ANY KIND OF NEW ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FROM
ITS SIDE BUT, OF COURSE, SUCH PROPOSALS AS WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

THE REALITY OF THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WOULD BE BASED UPON THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON IN THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. TO REPEAT ENDLESSLY THAT THE WEST IS AWAITING AN ANSWER TO ITS PROPOSALS OF DECEMBER 16, 1975, WHICH WERE LONG AGO REJECTED BY US BECAUSE OF THEIR OBVIOUSLY BIASED AND ONE-SIDED CHARACTER, TO IGNORE OUR SUBSEQUENT COMPROMISE PROPOSALS OF FEBRUARY 19, 1976, AND TO PROPOSE NOTHING IN RETURN - IS DELIBERATELY TO RETARD PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

22. SINCE, OBVIOUSLY, THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE WEST HAVE NOT YET RIPENED, WE ONCE AGAIN CALL UPON THE DELEGATIONS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO GIVE, FINALLY, A CONSTRUCTIVE ANSWER TO OUR PROPOSAL NOT TO INCREASE IN CENTRAL EUROPE THE ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES
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WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE REACHING OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, WHICH HAS NOW BEEN MADE SIGNIFICANTLY EASIER BY THE AVAILABILITY OF THE OFFICIAL DATA CONCERNING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE TWO GROUPINGS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WOULD BE EVIDENCE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE SIDES, WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE AND WOULD CREATE FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE BASIC TASK OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IN ANY CASE, THE REACHING OF THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE FAR MORE USEFUL FOR PEACE IN EUROPE THAN A NEW ARMS RACE.

23. THE SOCIALIST STATES CONSIDER THAT THE TASK OF CURBING THE ARMS RACE AND PROCEEDING TO A REAL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THE PRINCIPAL DIRECTION OF THE STRUGGLE FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF DETENTE AND FOR A STABLE PEACE. WE ARE READY TO DOUBLE AND TRIPLE OUR EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION. AS THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE CPSU AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, L I BREZHNEV, SAID IN A SPEECH IN PARIS ON JUNE 21 OF THIS YEAR:

"THE ROAD TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IS POSSIBLY STILL A LONG ONE, BUT IT IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN UNINTERRUPTED MOVEMENT FORWARD TOWARD THIS GOAL, THAT THERE BE NO STOPPING, AND THAT EACH YEAR AND MONTH SHOULD BRING WITH IT NEW PRACTICAL STEPS IN THIS OR THAT ASPECT OF CURBING THE ARMS RACE AND REDUCING THE

ARSENAL OF STATES AND DIMINISHING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR."
THIS STATEMENT FULLY APPLIES ALSO TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS
WHICH WERE CONVENED TO SOLVE THE EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT TASK
OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE.

END TEXT.RESOR
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Message Attributes

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